Abstract-The evolving of Fifth Generation (5G) networks is becoming more readily available as a major driver of the growth of new applications and business models. Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) are now proposed to be part of the 5G technology, integrated with Software Defined Networking (SDN), as key enablers of 5G and development of next generation intelligent vehicular networks and applications. In recent years, researchers have focused on the integration of SDN and VANET, and look at the architecture, operations, benefits of softwaredefined VANET services and new functionalities to support them. However, the complete transformation of the existing network into an SDN based architecture is still questionable, and the security and robustness of SDN have largely been neglected areas. Moreover, the deployment and integration of novel entities and several architectural components drive new security threats and vulnerabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the pervasive use of smart devices and advances in development of wireless access technologies (e.g., DSRC, WiFi, 4G/LTE, and 5G), the Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANET) have become an accessible technology for improving road safety and transportation efficiency [1] . Due to continuous advancements in VANET technologies, it is seen as a network which can provide various services such as vehicular cloud computing, surveillance, Internet of Thing (IoT) based advertising [2] , safety traffic management, to name a few. Although heterogeneous future architectures have been extensively investigated, the salient features of VANET (e.g., varying road density, high mobility) makes it challenging to coordinate VANETs to efficiently provide services with diverse quality of service requirements. Hence, programmable networking architectures are becoming key enablers for VANETS to enable interoperation among multiple underlying networks, conduct resource allocation tasks, and effectively manage a large number of mobile users with heterogeneous smart devices.
Recently, Software Defined Vehicular Networking (SDVN) has emerged as a promising paradigm to simplify network management and enable innovation through network programmability, gaining attention from both academia and industry. By decoupling the control and data planes in VANETs, network intelligence and state can be logically centralized and the network infrastructure is abstracted from the applications. The convergence of Software Defined Networking (SDN) with VANET technology can play an important role in addressing most of the VANETs challenges. In particular, the use of SDN's prominent features such as dynamic resource management and centralized control can enhance the user experience. These SDN features has the ability to meet the advance demands of VANETs which includes high throughput, high mobility, low communication latency, heterogeneity, scalability, to name a few. Initially, SDN-based innovations have mainly focused on data center networks, carrier backbone, and access networks. However, SDN and OpenFlow based techniques have recently being integrated in various wireless networks. For example, authors in [3] evaluated Stanford ONRC OpenRoads project, which envisions that users can flawlessly move between different types of wireless infrastructure [4] on a large scale testbed for live video streaming application. The results showed that SDN made it easy to implement handoff between APs and WiMAX base station and tri-casting video stream over both WiFi and WiMAX networks. Also, the cloud-medium access control (MAC) [5] , a software defined architecture for enterprise WLANs offer virtual wireless access points which greatly improves its management. Furthermore, there are recent efforts from research community to use the SDN for improving the performance of data communication process and network security in various next generation networks, such as IoT [6] and 5G [7] .
In SDVNs, the SDN controller create and maintain the repository which include network-wide knowledge (e.g., network resources status and network topology). It collects the global knowledge from heterogeneous networking devices such as SDN-enabled RSUC (Rode-Side-Unit Controller), RSU (Rode-Side-Unit), and BS (Base Station). By using the network-wide knowledge at SDN controller, the VANET and SDN applications that resides at application layer can program network policies or configurations on the networking devices through SDN controller, which can be accessed via North-Bound Interface (NBI). The SDN controller can enforce these configurations to the data plane elements by accessing these devices through South-Bound Interface (SBI) to produce coordinated and optimal decisions for vehicles. Despite of all the hype surrounding the emerging SDVNs, exploiting its full potential is still demanding, and security is considered as a key concern and an equally pressing challenge. In contrast, the complete transformation of the existing network into an SDN based architecture is still questionable, and the security and robustness of SDN have largely been neglected areas. Moreover, the use of virtual centralization of logic control (or intelligence) of the network and the rapidly evolving landscape of digital cyber threats that predominantly target the emerging SDVNs will cause even more devastating effects than they are in simple networks. Besides, the deployment of the SDVNs' novel entities and several architectural components drive new security threats and vulnerabilities. Consequently, it is required to perform research to further investigate the standardization efforts and address challenging issues (both, old and new) in the SDVNs.
A. Contributions
In this paper, first we thoroughly discuss the working methodology of the state-of-the-art SDN-enabled Vehicular Network (SDVN) architectures and provide a generic design of vehicular network architecture integrated with SDN and other novel paradigms. We also investigate these architectures to identify their benefits and challenges against the traditional VANETs, mainly regarding the security and the communication reliability parameters. Then we describe the potential requirements and key enablers toward a secure SDVN while we perform a security analysis of the existing SDVNs. Finally, an array of open research issues are presented that requires attention of the researchers and professionals to establish a way forward towards a more secure and efficient SDVN that could enable the VANET usage in next generation VANET applications. In particular, this paper provides the following key contributions.
• We survey the state-of-the-art SDN based vehicular network architectures for their benefits and challenges, mainly regarding security and performance of data communication processes. We believe that our survey will provide the required insights that will help to the possible development of a more secure and robust SDVN architecture. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive work that presents such a survey and analysis on SDVNs. Based on our survey, we provide a generic design of SDVN architecture.
• We present a detailed security analysis for an array of security threats along with their existing and possible countermeasures for the state-of-the-art SDVNs. Our analysis includes the security threats coming from the individual technologies (i.e., SDN only or VANET only), and the threats that results from the integration of SDN and VANETs (i.e., SDVNs). Finally, we discuss the lessons learned with the directions of future research work in this direction.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide the required background overview about the vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) and software defined networks (SDNs) along with their benefits and challenges. In Section III, we present the design of a generic SDVN architecture along with the survey of the state-of-the-art SDVN architectures. Additionally, the benefits and challenges of the existing SDVN architectures has been discussed in Section III. In Section IV, we present security analysis against an array of threats that could be launched on the SDVN architectures, and we discuss the existing and new possible solutions to countermeasure these threats. The lessons learned and the possible directions for future work are presented in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide a brief overview of VANET (in Section II-A) and SDN (in Section II-B) technologies along with their working methodology, benefits, and challenges. Here, we only provide the details that are essential to understand the SDVN architectures that we have surveyed and investigated in the latter sections of this paper. The comprehensive overview of these two networking technologies is out of the scope of this paper, and we direct the interested readers to existing detailed surveys given in [8] and [1] .
A. Introduction to VANETs
VANET provides a wireless communication between vehicles using a dedicated short range communication (DSRC) [9] . The DSRC is an IEEE 802.11a amended for low overhead operation to 802.11p; the IEEE then standardises the whole communication stack by the 1609 family of standards referring to wireless access in vehicular environments (WAVE) [10] . A vehicle can communicate with other vehicles directly forming vehicle to vehicle communication (V2V) or communicate with a fixed equipment referred to as road side unit (RSU) forming vehicle to infrastructure communication (V2I).
These types of communications allow vehicles to share different kinds of information, for example, safety information for the purpose of accident prevention, and post-accident investigation or traffic jams. Other type of information can be disseminated such as passenger related information, which is considered as non-safety information [11] . The intention behind distributing and sharing the information is to provide safety message to warn drivers about expected hazards to decrease the number of accidents, or to provide passengers with pleasant journeys [12] . Several challenges are facing researchers and developers when developing VANET applications, protocols, and simulation tools. Some researches have investigated the communication and networking aspects of VANET and addressed the security and privacy issues [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] . Others focus on the routing protocols for VANET and their requirements to achieve better communication time with less consumption of network bandwidth [16] , [17] , [18] . Recently, some research works also investigate on providing more reliable and efficient services by integrating heterogeneous access networks such as LTE, 5G, NDN, Edge computing, and SDN [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] .
The communication between vehicles, or between a vehicle and an RSU is achieved through a wireless medium called WAVE. The main system components are the application unit (AU), OBU, and RSU [10] . The RSU hosts an application that provides services and the OBU is a device that uses the services provided. The application may reside in the RSU or in the OBU, the device that hosts the application is called the provider and the device using the application is described as user. Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU and a set of sensors to collect and process the information then send it on as a message to other vehicles or RSUs through the wireless medium [10] . A vehicle carries a single or multiple application units (AUs) that use the applications provided by the provider using OBU connection. Moreover the RSU can also connect to the Internet which allows AU's from different vehicles to connect to the Internet.
The communication between vehicles, the RSU, and the infrastructure form three types of domains:
• In-vehicle domain that consists of an OBU and one or multiple AUs. The connection could be wired or wireless and an OBU and an AU can reside in a single device. The OBU provides a communication link to the AU to execute one or a set of applications provided by the application provider.
• Ad hoc domain: The ad hoc domain on VANET is composed of vehicles equipped with OBUs and a roadside unit (RSU). Figure 1 ). When there is no direct connection between them, a routing protocol is used to forward data from one vehicle to another until it reaches the destination point, forming multi-hop V2V communication. -Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication: Vehicle communicates with an RSU to increase the range of communication by sending, receiving, and forwarding data from one node to another or to benefit from the ability of the RSU to process special applications forming V2I communication as depicted in Figure 1 .
• Infrastructural domain: In this case, the RSU connects to the infrastructural networks or to the Internet, in order to allow the OBU to access the infrastructure network. It is possible that the AUs are registered with the OBU to connect to any internet based host. Literature shows that a number of security threats exists in VANETs and a large number of these threats have been addressed [23] . In [24] , the authors present three kinds of security threats in VANETs, including attacks on safety-related applications, attacks on payment-based applications, and attacks on privacy. They further proposed certain recommended mechanisms to resolve security issues in VANETs. For example, establishing vehicular public key infrastructure, and setting up an Event Data Recording (EDR) machine and tamper-proof hardware vehicles. Moreover, in [12] , the authors propose some security requirements and an architecture for securing safety applications in VANETs. In [14] , the authors focus on the position cheating attack. In particular, they determine the impact of different number of malicious vehicles on delaying the alert warning messages in vehicular communications. They further identify the most effective strategies that could be used by malicious vehicles to maximize the delay of the alert message, and thus strengthen the impact of the attacker. In [25] , the authors analyze security challenges and potential privacy threats specific to vehicular cloud, these includes authentication of high-mobility vehicles, and the complexity of establishing trust relationships among multiple players that are due to intermittent short-range communications.
B. Software Defined Networking
The core concept of SDN [26] is the decoupling between control plane and data plane. At control plane, a logically centralized entity (called controller) is used for managing network resources to perform efficient network traffic control. The data plane is basically a networking infrastructure used for data forwarding, and it consists of forwarding devices and wired or wireless communication links. SDN facilitates communication between devices from various vendors via standardized interfaces. Hence, it significantly simplifies network management, and offers programmable and flexible network architecture.
The most commonly used programmable interface that provides communication between control and data planes is known as OpenFlow protocol [27] , and it runs on top of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Apart from data and control planes, SDN also has a third plane called application plane, which consists of third party network services and applications. These SDN applications explicitly, directly, and programmatically communicate their network requirements and desired network behavior to the controller via an application-control interface. In particular, SDN uses two main programming interfaces which includes, the Control-Data Interface (also known as southbound API such OpenFlow and NETCONF), and the Application-Control Interface (also known as northbound API such REST API).
In a typical SDN network, each OpenFlow-enabled Switch (OF-Switch) connects to other OF-Switches and possibly to end-user devices that are the sources and destinations of traffic flows in the network. Each OF-Switch has multiple tables implemented in hardware or firmware that it uses to process (i.e., routing) the received packets. In particular, the controller modifies the content of the table called forwarding table.
Upon reception of a packet, the OF-Switch performs a lookup in its forwarding table to find the entry which specifies the corresponding action for the received packet. In case there is no matching entry for the packet, a table-miss occurs and the packet is processed as per the action(s) stated in the table-miss (or default) entry, for instance, action could be for the OFSwitch to encapsulate the packet and send it to the controller through the southbound API or action could be to drop the packet. The controller simply manages the behavior of the network by sending flowmod packets that modifies the content of forwarding table at OF-Switches. The detailed discussion on SDN architecture and its technologies are out of the scope of this paper, for a comprehensive study on SDN please refer to [26] and [28] .
1) Benefits and Challenges:
The SDN significantly simplifies management of network resources and deployment of networking applications by separating the control logic from forwarding devices and using a logically centralized control. Although SDN brings huge success, but the inherent characteristics (e.g., software control agents on the switches, limited bandwidth of southbound channel, and limited processing capacity of SDN controllers) of SDN architecture also raises new security concerns. Below, we briefly summarize both the major benefits and challenges that are associated with the innovative SDN technologies. • Improved network security: The controller can gather essential information about the network by communicating with the OF-Switches. These switches can collect the required information by using the traffic analysis or anomaly-detection tools. Later, the controller analyzes and correlate the feedback from the network entities to create or update its global network view. Based on analysis results, new security policies to prevent an attack can be propagated across the network. This way it is expected that the increased performance and programmability of SDN along with the network view can speed up the control and containment of network security threats.
• Single point of failures: The centralized SDN controller, low bandwidth communication channel between the controller and OF-Switch, and flow-table size limitation on OF-Switches, makes the SDN vulnerable to an array of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Moreover, the issue of trust between network elements due to the open programmability of the network, and the lack of best practices specific to SDN functions and components remains major bottlenecks in the rapid and real-world adoption of SDN.
• Slow propagation of bad information: At OF-Switch, once a specific traffic flow packet matches with an entry in the forwarding table, the switch knows how to treat the remainin g packets of the same flow and does not need further interactions with the controller. While this increases the traffic forwarding efficiently of the switch, but issues arise when the forwarding table rules are no longer consistent with the dynamic network conditions. That is, if network conditions such as topology have changed, than until the controller inserts or updates the forwarding table entry, the OF-switch will use the old (and potentially incorrect) rule for processing the incoming packets. 
III. SDN BASED VEHICULAR NETWORKS
In this section, first we present a systematic survey of the state-of-the-art SDN-based VANET (SDVN) architectures. Then we will discuss the identified benefits and challenges concerning the performance gain and the robustness of data communication system in these architectures. In performance gain, we will provide an analysis of the impact on communication reliability, network throughput, network delay, resource utilization, and system complexity. While in robustness, we will discuss the impact concerning fault-tolerance, resistance to security attacks, and the size of attack surface.
Applying SDN in VANETs without any modification entails several challenges, mainly due to VANET's highly dynamic network topology which is attributed to the fast moving network nodes (i.e., vehicles). In particular, the key challenge in SDVN is to mitigate or minimize: (i) the huge management overhead on the controller, and (ii) the congestion on the control-data communication channel. With the frequently changing network topology, keeping the updated version of global network topology at controller is not only cost intensive and time consuming, but it also introduce inaccuracies in the received updated information. It is true even in the cases where the controller is able to keep an updated global topology view. However, some of the existing decentralized V2V and V2I communication protocols may not be able to fully utilize the advantage of SDN's global topology information system. Hence, the network protocols might need redesigning to become adaptable with the SDN entities.
A. Overview of state-of-the-art SDVN Architectures
In this section, we present a comprehensive survey on the existing research on SDVNs which includes a brief description of the proposed SDVN architectures along with their working methodology. We start our survey with the classification of the future SDVN architectures based on their integration with different paradigms (such as 5G, cloud computing, edge computing, and NDN), which has been done to improve their performance for specific and generic application domains. Table I provides a brief summary of all the SDVN research works available in the state-of-the-art along with their key benefits and drawbacks. We broadly classify the surveyed SDVN architectures in following two categories.
• specific-purpose emerging vehicular networks based on SDN paradigm (SP-SDVNs): These architectures aim to improve specific VANET parameters such as network delay, QoS, access control, routing reliability, and security in data communication by using SDN technology. In some cases, to improve a set of parameters, the proposed architectures possibly use additional technologies (apart from SDN) such as 5G, named data networking (NDN), and fog or edge computing; and
• general-purpose emerging vehicular networks based on SDN (GP-SDVNs): These architectures aim to improve the overall performance of VANETs by integrating it with SDN and other technologies.
Before we start our survey on the state-of-the-art SDVN proposals, we provide an overview of a generic SDVN architecture, which includes a comprehensive set of technologies and features that could satisfy a large set of VANET applications. Most of the existing SDVN architecture designs are subset of this generic SDVN design. Figure 2 provides a high level view of our generic architecture for an SDN-based VANET along with its major components and their interactions. The data plane entities (e.g., smart vehicles) communicate with the control plane entities (global SDN and local RSU controllers, RSUs, and base stations) using the southbound APIs for coordinated and efficient communication. The controllers perform various functions such as routing, information gathering, and providing services to end-users based on the instructions and policies received through northbound APIs from the application layer entities. The controller provides an up-to-date network view to the application plane that helps it to manage various services (e.g., security, access control, mobility, and QoS) in the network. Specifically, vehicles communicate with their connected RSU or BS (i.e., RSUCs) which provide local networking services with low latency and maintain entire local knowledge. In parallel to serving the vehicle nodes, the RSUCs and BSs send their entire vehicle information and transportation data to the global SDN controller. Based on the information received from the RSUCs, the network administrator that is sitting at the highest control of global SDN controller builds a network-wide resource view of vehicle nodes. At application layer, the various SDN and VANET applications communicate with the SDN controller (or RSUCs) via the NBI to program optimal network configurations and accomplish VANET business services.
To reduce the latency while providing time-sensitive services to the vehicles in SDVN, the local controllers are equipped with fog computing services (refer to Figure 2 ). These controllers perform the required processing for timesensitive tasks on the received data before the data is sent to the cloud computing enabled data centers for further processing and analysis. Due to the availability of local controllers and Fog services (i..e, Fog enabled data plane elements) in SDVN, the architecture presented in Figure 2 could operate in Hybrid Control Mode (HCM) which improves network performance and robustness. In HCM, the SDN controller takes only partial control of the system, and it shares the work with RSUCs. This arrangement helps in situations where the local controller lost their connectivity with the global controller, and the vehicle nodes can still perform their networking tasks with the help of local controllers.
Researchers consider SDN as a promising technology to bridge the gap between the heterogeneity of wireless infrastructures and the inflexibility in protocol deployment for vehicular communications. For instance, authors in [29] propose a novel routing framework for SDVN scrutinizing the stability of routes in addition to the shortest travel time. Thus, it improves the packet delivery and decreases the latency. The proposed approach uses availability of network-wide information at SDN controller to identify the most stable routes with shortest path between the communicating nodes. An architecture similar to Figure 2 is considered in [29] , the source and destination vehicles are located in the coverage area of the same RSUC, and the further routing decision will be made by RSUs or BS independently to minimize the overall vehicular service delay. Authors in [19] and [20] proposed an architectural design and a set of services towards SDVNs. In [19] , the proposed architecture aims to provide flexibility and programmability to networks, and it introduces new services and features for VANETs to cope up with the increasingly new requirements of advanced VANET applications. The authors demonstrate the feasibility and communication efficiency of SDVNs deployment by comparing SDN-based VANET routing with traditional MANET/VANET routing protocols. In [20] , the goal was to enable rapid network innovation for vehicular communications. The architecture consists of different entities like vehicles, road-side units, and heterogeneous wireless devices, which are abstracted as switches with a unified interface. The authors also present some useful use cases to demonstrate how their architecture enables rapid network innovation. One advantage of the proposed architecture is that it allows programmability by selecting and deploying routing protocols on demand, another advantage is that it provides flexibility by using network slicing to isolate multiple tenants. To increase the robustness of the communication system in SDVNs, authors in [30] propose a hierarchical SDVN architecture that aims to improve performance in the situations where connection loss between vehicles and primary SDN controller are considered.
To meet the demands of future VANET scenarios such as intelligent transportation systems (ITS), automated overtake, and autonomous driving, authors in [31] propose a SDVN architecture which uses fog computing services to offer delaysensitive and location-awareness services. But, the paper lacks the validation of their proposed architecture. Taking a step further, authors in [21] proposes a new SDVN architecture assisted by mobile edge computing (MEC), which integrates different types of access technologies to provide low-latency and high-reliability communication. The proposed architecture is validated by a case study, named reliable communication in urban traffic management. The simulation results show that the architecture meets the application specific requirements concerning latency, reliability, and data rate. Similarly, authors in [22] propose an SDVN architecture with edge computing services to distribute software updates to vehicles in a flexible way. The architecture efficiently uses V2V beaconing information to construct the global topology view at SDN controllers, which is used to control the network in a systematic way. Additionally, to tackle the interference and hidden node problems, the SDN controller executes a novel scheme that uses mathematical optimization to assign different operating frequencies to vehicles. Finally, authors in [32] propose a delay minimization routing algorithm for SDVNs which uses machine learning techniques to predict mobility patterns in the network. Instead of relying on the delay minimization techniques such as edge services and continuously monitoring of vehicle location, the authors employed Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to learn and predict the vehicle arrival rate, which helps to perform a traffic mobility estimation by building the statistical traffic model, and then make routing decisions to vehicles. With the rapid advancements in next generation technologies such as 5G and automotive applications, VANETs are now proposed to be part of the 5G technology, integrated with SDN, as key enabler of 5G. For instance, authors in [33] propose three-way integration between VANETs, SDN, and 5G for a resilient VANET security design approach. The aim is to strike a good balance between network, mobility, performance, and security features. The proposed architecture is evaluated against an array of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks targeting either the SDN controllers or the vehicles. Additionally, solutions to trace back the source of the attack have been discussed. Similarly, authors in [34] propose a buffer-aware streaming approach that allow users to play multimedia streaming over SDN-based vehicular 5G networks. The proposal aims to achieve minimum delay and have better QoS during handover between different eNodeBs. To achieve the adequate QoS, the SDN gathers information regarding user mobility and status of the player buffer. The current strength of the network signal is used to provide an efficient transmission strategy for multimedia streaming.
To further minimize the communication latency and to improve the QoS, authors in [35] and [36] propose a 5G SDVN that integrates with cloud and fog computing services. The proposal uses SDN to improve scalability and flexibility of vehicular networks, while fog cells has been introduced and fog computing is performed at the edge of the network to reduce the communication latency. The overall architecture is composed of various elements that includes cloud computing centers, SDN controllers, RSU centers, RSUs, BSs, fog computing clusters, vehicles, and users. It includes infrastructure-to-infrastructure (I2I) links, vehicle-toinfrastructure (V2I) links, and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) links. The information is shared among vehicles and users under the control of fog computing clusters. The SDN controllers collect and forward the state information of fog computing clusters to the cloud computing centers. The control information is transmitted to fog computing clusters by SDN controllers. The data plane consists of vehicles, BSs, and RSUs, while the control plane consists of RSU centers and SDN controllers. The RSU center is the control center of a fog cell. This fog cell is composed of vehicles and an RSU to avoid the frequent handover between the RSU and vehicles. Vehicles in a fog cell communicate using a multi-hop relay. Authors in [37] explore the possibilities of integrating cluster-based VANETs with 5G cellular networks to save scarce spectrum resources, preventing network congestion, and improving packet delivery ratio. In particular, a SDN-enabled social-aware clustering algorithm is proposed for 5G-VANET systems, which exploits the social patterns (e.g., vehicles' future routes) to create a prediction model to enhance the stability of the clusters. Due to the challenges of finding an effective clustering algorithm which is adaptive to dynamic VANETs, authors consider the SDN paradigm.
After proposing different designs for SDVN architectures, the research community has shifted its focus towards evaluating and improving the data communication process and other networking services (such as QoS, security, and privacy) in these SDVN architectures. To this end, various solutions has been proposed that either exploits the unique in-built features of SDN or develops new techniques to achieve the application specific or generic requirements in SDVNs. For instance, authors in [38] propose SDN based solutions to improve the data offloading mechanism in vehicular networks. The mechanism comprises of a priority manager and a load balance at SDN controller. Later, the Stackelberg game is proposed for network selection. The data offloading solution improves the network congestion to provide high scalability with minimal cost. Similarly, authors in [39] propose a V2V data offloading technique for cellular network inside a Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) architecture based on the SDN. The proposed offloading technique uses each vehicle's context information (e.g., location, speed, direction and IDs), and it adopts a centralized management strategy for calculation and notification of routing paths to paired vehicles that are currently communicating with each other using a cellular network.
For a better resource scheduling, the authors in [40] use the SDN as a unified resource manager in vehicular communications. The proposed solution performs centralized scheduling of all network resources in the control plane. SDVN can choose the optimal network interfaces whenever an application wants to transmit data. The integration of SDN with heterogeneous vehicular communication ensures a low cost communication overhead. In [41] , authors present a service channel allocation scheme adapted to SDN-enabled vehicular communications. In particular, a controller have a holistic overview of the network and the available spectrum resources and it can decide for every type of service or traffic which channel to use at each time. A key benefit from the SDNenabled vehicular communications is that it avoids conflicts and interference. The architecture also ensures traffic load balancing among different service channels.
To optimize network management, SDN-based vehicular communication has been proposed by providing an optimal share of network resources in [42] . A static distribution of network resources to RSUs can be ineffective, for instance, when the traffic density within the transmission range of an RSU increases, the RSU will handle more data flows which might result in degradation in QoE. The proposed model proposes a flow and power management mechanism implemented into controller. After identifying vehicles that are unsatisfactory (i.e., their QoE decreases), the model adjusts their signal levels by minimizing the interference with RSUs. The main idea is based on a flow management algorithm that distributes unsatisfactory vehicles to each RSU. SDN has been also used in order to manage cooperative message dissemination in vehicular communications in [43] . In particular, the RSU controls data dissemination over V2V and I2V channels. The centralized RSU delivers scheduling decisions to vehicles with a set of instructions to which channel to tune to and which data to transmit or receive. This approach enables cooperative dissemination by using the SDN paradigm. Recently, authors in [44] propose a hierarchical 5G next generation VANET architecture, which integrates the centralization and flexibility of SDN and Cloud Radio Access Network (C-RAN) with 5G communication technologies for effective allocation of resources using the SDN global view. The architecture also incorporates a fog computing framework that consists of zones and clusters at the edge to avoid frequent handovers between vehicles and RSUs.
In all the above discussed SDVNs, the placement of controller and open-flow switches is application specific. For instance, the SDN controller can be installed at RSUs, base stations, data centers, or vehicles, while the open-flow switch functionalities are usually installed in vehicles. As far as we know, all the proposed SDVN architectures did not considered integrating security modules or analyzing any of the security issues of their proposed architectures, which is a serious concern due to the use of VANETs in life-sensitive applications.
B. Benefits and Challenges
In this section, we will discuss the major benefits and research challenges that we have extracted from our survey on the SDVNs architectures that was presented in previous section.
Benefits: The benefits of SDN-enabled VANET are multiple, such as rapid network configuration, improving user experience by efficient resource utilization, minimizing service latency, and resistance to some inherited attacks of SDN or VANETs. Below, we discuss some of the major benefits of SDVNs.
• Optimized resource utilization -The availability of global topology view helps the SDN controller to manage the network resource efficiently in SDVNs. For instance, when multiple wireless interfaces or configurable radios are available, than controller can choose a better coordination of channel/frequency. Similarly, due to awareness of network resources at controller, it can decide whether changing the power of wireless interfaces, and therefore its transmission range, is a logical choice or not. For example, the controller determines that node density is too sparse and commands all nodes to increase transmission power to achieve more reasonable packet delivery. In safety related applications, SDN can also improve and reduce the number of broadcast messages exchanged in VANETs with the consequent advantage of efficiently using network resources through collision reduction. In [45] , the authors use this capability in defining an SDN architecture for GeoBroadcast in VANETs. Normally, every periodic warning message received by nearest RSU from the source vehicle is routed to the control center in the intelligent transport system, where it is redirected to every other RSU located in the geographical area for broadcasting. This produces a considerable overhead, and thus a waste of bandwidth. In [46] , the first warning message received by the source RSU is sent to the SDN controller, which sets up the paths to the destination RSUs, and installs flow entries on RSUs and intermediates nodes. These paths will be followed by all the other periodic warning messages to broadcast. Therefore, controller overhead, message latency, and network bandwidth consumption are all reduced at the same time. Such a scheme can improve performance in many scenarios, both static (e.g., car accident) and dynamic (e.g., clear the way for an ambulance).
• Fast and flexible network configuration -The separation of control and logic plane in SDVNs provide support to the rapid and flexible network configurations. It will help to meet the varying requirements of the applications and to adapt the changes in network topology caused by vehicles mobility. For instance, due to the shortest path routing approach or due to video dominant applications which occupy large bandwidth on the path, congestion is occurred on some selected nodes. When an SDN controller discovers such situation, it can start a reroute traffic process to improve network utility and to reduce congestion.
• Heterogeneous network integration -In SDVNs, the SDN controller provides the abstraction between VANET applications and networking infrastructure, which enables support for the integration of heterogeneous networks (e.g., wired and wireless) and communication technologies (e.g., DSRC, WiFi, LTE, and 5G).
• Minimizing service latency -The use of SDN enables the implementation and management of fog computing services at network edge routers, which significantly reduces the service latency for delay sensitive applications. An SDN-enabled VANET has the advantage of dynamically adapting to topology changes by re-configuring data forwarding rules in the network. In particular, SDN minimizes service latency and improves user experience, while meeting the frequent and variable service demands of citizens and drivers. For instance, if a vehicle A is out of the coverage range of the RSU, but it can get the content service from another neighbor vehicle B, which is currently within the RSU coverage range, the RSU controller (RSUC) could allocate more resources to vehicle B to allow content delivery to vehicle A in an Information Centric Networking (ICN) fashion [47] . Similarly, an SDN controller can manage the number of data flows per RSU, making sure each flow is served according to the expected QoS [42] .
Challenges: The state-of-the-art SDVNs faces issues in their large scale deployment in real-world applications, it is due to the following challenges in these architectures.
• Dynamic network topology -The high vehicle mobility causes rapid changes in SDVN topology and instability in wireless communication channels. The frequent topology changes also hinder the real-time collection of the network information required at the controller to keep the global view up-to-date. The delayed or inaccurate global view leads the controller to experience delays in distributing commands to network elements. Therefore, efficient solutions to provide high mobility management is a significant concern that requires serious attention to promote the adoption of SDVNs. Although many solutions (such as use of fog computing and local controllers at network edges) have been proposed to address this challenge, these solutions are still in their early stages and cannot be adopted in SDVNs. The inclusion of the movement behavior of vehicles in predicting network stability can be a solution for the high mobility problem. However, an accurate and effective implementation of such solution is challenging.
• Broader flow rule definitions and policies -In SDN, the switches maintain forwarding tables which contain three entries called rules, actions associated with each rule, and counters for counting the number of packets and bytes for different data sessions. However, the existing flow rules and policies that governs the data communication in SDN network needs to be enhanced to meet the requirements of the broad range of VANET applications. For instance, instead of sending specific flow rules, SDN controller could send an abstract policy in which specific behavior will be decided by RSUs or BSs depending on their own local knowledge. Data at RSUs and BSs is then sent to data center through SDN controller for global, long-term purposes [31] .
• Security and privacy considerations -In SDVNs, the SDN controllers are responsible for managing network resources and controlling various network operations (e.g., security, traffic management, and QoS services), therefore it is imperative to protect the SDN controllers from different cyber attacks. The propagation of malicious information to controller from adversaries can lead to serious accidents. For example, DoS attacks can be launched to paralyze the operations of controllers, or controllers can be compromised through inside attacks. Hence, the security of controller becomes priority because it is the centralized decision point in SDVNs. Additionally, the new security vulnerabilities that might occur due to the integration of the VANET and SDN or other technologies with SDVNs needs to be investigated before the deployment of such hybrid architectures.
• Interworking gaps among heterogeneous networks -The coexistence of heterogeneous V2X networks require efficient interworking mechanisms that allow efficient communication between these networks. Also, the existing SDVN architectures are lacking standardized Eastbound/Westbound APIs and Northbound APIs for vehicular applications.
• Misbehavior of elements from different technologies (e.g., cloud, 5G, and ICN) involved -The use of various technologies and architectures in realizing the next generation VANET applications also increases its attack vector. It is because misbehaving or vulnerability in any one of the integrated technology might effect the operations of the whole VANET. For instance, we have discussed above that the use of SDN controller adds new set of security vulnerabilities in the network. Similarly, the drawbacks in other integrating technologies (e.g., cloud, 5G, and ICN) can significantly increase the threats in the integrated network. In [48] , the authors present general security vulnerabilities and attacks for a software defined vehicular network. The work discusses the security implications of the software-defined vehicular network at each layer. SDVN is a layered architecture where security implications pertaining to any layer can affect the other layers and are heavily dependent. In order to optimize the control plane in software defined networks, the authors in [49] propose a rebating mechanism to optimize the southbound communication. This strategy makes a trade off between cellular network access cost and network control latency. Later, the authors evaluate their strategy and the impact of rebating and assignment of bandwidth on the controller bandwidth management.
IV. SDVNS SECURITY ANALYSIS & COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss the weaknesses of the stateof-the-art SDVNs against major security attacks that violates security services such as availability, confidentiality, authentication, and data integrity. We also discuss the existing countermeasures and provide possible solutions to handle the identified vulnerabilities.
In Table II , we present the main attacks that threaten SDN systems, VANET, and whether they could be persistent in SDVN environments. When an attack targets the softwaredefined networks, it mostly impacts also the SDVN architectures such as the control plane resource consumption, the network topology poisoning, and rule conflicts. Moreover, attacks that are tailored against vehicular systems are most of them persistent on the SDVN architectures such as the on-board tampering, the jamming, and the application-based attacks. Attacks as the replay attack, the sybil, the sinkhole, malware injection, privacy violation, forgery, distributed DoS are persistent in SDN, VANET, and SDVN but with different requirements and impact on each technology.
A. Control Plane Resource Consumption.
Most of the SDVN architectures proposed in the literature [19] , [20] , [30] , [33] , [34] , [44] have been designed without security in mind. In particular, they are vulnerable to control plane resource consumption which is a major weakness in SDN. This attack happens when there are many requests from the data plane to the control plane. As in SDVN, the control plane is composed by RSU controllers can dynamically 
enforce flow rules when the data plane requires (i.e., reactive mode), and it enables to control the network efficiently. However, this kind of reactive mode control can cause serious problem when there are too many requests from the data plane to the control plane. It is a serious problem to both of controllers (RSU controllers) and switches (vehicles). In the case of the RSU controller in [19] , [30] , it should handle much more requests than usual, thus, it can face serious performance problems. For instance, a situation could arise where further network packets can not be handled by the switch/vehicle or they should wait until the switch/vehicle clears off old flow rules. Finally, this kind of attack can consume resources of the control plane (flow rule handling capacity) and the data plane (flow rule entries). Possible countermeasures to the control plane resource consumption in SDVN architectures can be an adoption of current solutions in SDN such as in [50] , [51] , [52] , [53] . In [50] , the authors proposed to keep both control plane and data plane working when suffering from data-to-control plane saturation attacks. In particular, they adopt the packet migration concept. Also, they used the data plane cache concept in order to distinguish fake packets from normal packets and discard them to reduce table-miss. In a typical SDVN architecture, the two modules can be added at the controller level. In [52] , the authors proposed LineSwitch, a solution based on probability and blacklisting which offers both resiliency against SYN flooding-based control plane saturation attacks and protection from buffer saturation vulnerabilities. In [53] , FloodDefender is based on three techniques: table-miss engineering, packet filter, and flow rule management. The idea is to mitigate the bandwidth jamming, reduce computational resource consumption, and save the memory space of switches. However, adopting these solutions without any modification might not be beneficial for the SDVNs due to the characteristics (e.g., high mobility, dynamic network topology, and resource constraints) of SDVNs data plane elements which are very different from the data plane elements of the SDN.
B. Network Topology Poisoning.
The topology information is adopted by most of the controller's core services and upper-layer applications, e.g., those related to packet routing, mobility tracking, and network virtualization and optimization [54] , [55] . If such network topology information is poisoned, all the dependent network services will become immediately affected, causing catastrophic problems. For example, the routing services/apps inside the controller can be manipulated to incur a black-hole route or man-in-the middle attack. Also an attacker can hijack the location of a network server to phish its service subscribers. In a smart parking application using the SDVN architectures in [36] , the attacker can hijack the location of an RSU to phish its service subscribers. Also, an adversary can inject false links to create a black-hole route or launch a man-inthe-middle attack to eavesdrop or manipulate messages in the network. Architectures in [19] , [20] , [30] , [38] , [40] , [36] are vulnerable to the network topology poisoning.
TopoGuard [56] and SPHINX [57] attempt to detect these topology tampering attacks via monitoring of switch-based sensors and packets sent to the SDN controller. TopoGuard relies on behavioral profiling and invariant checking to detect false network links and spoofed end-hosts, respectively. The basic idea of TopoGuard is to secure OpenFlow controllers by fixing security omissions. In TopoGuard, the authors design a module of topology update checker to automatically validate the update of network topology, which is dependent on the information provided by port manager and host tracker [56] . SPHINX uses an anomaly-detection approach, relying on the inconsistencies in network state at different sensors to detect attacks. In [55] , the authors propose an extension to TopoGuard called TopoGuard+. The solution prevents inband Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) port amnesia attacks (that are existing in TopoGuard) through monitoring of characteristic control plane message patterns generated as part of the attack. In particular, the authors build a defense against out-of-band port amnesia attacks. These attacks rely on an attacker having access to a secret channel used to relay LLDP packets outside of the network. The defense takes advantage of this, and it detects unavoidable latency additions introduced by processing packets over the external channel.
C. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks.
SDVN architectures [58] are vulnerable to DDoS attacks. Since SDVNs architectures are split into three main functional layers: infrastructure layer (vehicles, RSU), control layer (RSU controllers), and application layer, then potential DDoS attacks can be launched on any one or more of these three layers.
As a countermeasure to DDoS, one might use the solution in [59] , where authors propose a self organizing maps (SOM), a machine learning technique for DDoS detection. In this approach, the SOM is trained by collecting the flow statistics from OpenFlow switches. The parameters that are checked for training are the average packets per flow, average bytes per flows, average duration per flow, percentage of pair flows, growth of single flow, and growth of single ports. However, using such a solution at vehicles could be problematic due to their resource constraint nature when compared with the generic SDN switches. Another solution Floodguard [60] consists on preventing data-to-control plane saturation attack by using packet migration and data plane cache. The packet migration detects flooding attacks and aims to protect switch and controller when attack occurs. Data plane cache is a machine that stores proactive flow rules, caches table-miss packets and distinguishes fake packets from normal packets.
D. Rule conflicts violating existing security policies.
OpenFlow provides no inherent mechanisms to reconcile rule conflicts as competing OpenFlow applications assert new rules into a switch. For example, a set of rules designed to quarantine an internal computing server (i.e., a QUARAN-TINE action) might subsequently be overridden by a loadbalancing application that may determine that the quarantined host is now the least-loaded server [61] . Such vulnerabilities can be exploited by an attacker in the SDVN architectures presented in [38] , [40] , [19] , [21] , [37] . Possible countermeasures can be adopted to solve the rule conflicts in SDN based applications. For instance, FortNOX [62] solves the rule conflicts that violate existing security policies in SDN, and provides role-based authorization and security constraint enforcement in the controller kernel. One may install FortNOX features in the RSU controller in case of SDVNs.
E. Privacy.
User related information including the driver's name, the license plate, speed, position, and traveling routes along with their relationships has to be protected; while the authorities should be able to reveal their identities in case of a dispute [63] . The collection of these information in the RSU controller can interfere with the personal data of drivers, and thus violate the privacy of drivers. Conditional privacy preserving mechanisms in vehicular communications can be adapted to vehicular software architectures. In [64] , the authors propose GSIS, a solution that integrates the group based signatures and ID based signatures, and offer security and privacy preserving mechanisms between different OBUs, and between OBUs and RSUs. In [65] , the authors propose a location privacy preserving authentication scheme based on blind signature in the elliptic curve domain. The scheme guarantees the security and location anonymity to the public. Using the proposed scheme, the probability of tracing a vehicles route is small. However, in SDVNs, the lack of secure communication channel (i.e., southbound interface) between the control and data plane, and disclosure on network resources stored at SDN or RSU controllers could expose the VANET users to various privacy risks. For instance, the leakage of vehicle features (e.g., location and link information) collected on SDN controller bring privacy threats to the vehicles.
F. Forgery.
An attacker can forge and transmit false hazard warning information or other messages, and it can rapidly contaminate the large portions of the VANET coverage area [12] , [14] . An attacker for instance broadcasts a forged GPS signal, so that vehicles get wrong position data. Examples of countermeasures against this attack is to ensure secure localization. In [66] , triangulation is used to determine the position of a vehicle from three reference points. Due to the upper bound of the distance between the reference points and the vehicle, attackers cannot decrease the distance between two neighboring nodes. In [67] , Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is proposed to determine the position of a device from a set of reference points whose positions are known in advance, based on the distances measured between the reference points and the vehicle. Autonomous position verification [68] is a mechanism to detect and mitigate the impact of falsified position information in position-based routing protocols at VANETs. It is based on various concepts such as the acceptance range threshold, maximum density threshold, and position claim overhearing to estimate the trustworthiness of a neighbor's position claims. In [12] , the authors propose a secure distributed location verification to detect vehicles cheating about their positions. The detection mechanism does not rely on additional hardware but only on collaborative neighbors.
G. Tampering.
In in-transit tampering, a node acting as a relay can disrupt communications of other nodes. It can drop or corrupt messages, or meaningfully modify messages. Tampering with in-transit messages may be simpler and more powerful than forgery attacks. On-board tampering consists on leveraging the data plane level of SDVN architectures composed by different vehicles. In particular, an attacker may select to tinker with data, e.g., velocity, location, status of vehicle parts at their source, tampering with the on-board sensing and other hardware. To detect tampered data packets, approaches are based on anomaly detection behaviors. For instance, in [69] , the authors propose an autonomous watchodog formation to ensure that watchdog nodes monitor the behaviors of the relaying nodes.
H. Jamming.
The jammer deliberately generates interfering transmissions that prevent communication within their reception range. An attacker can relatively easily partition the network, without compromising cryptographic mechanisms and with limited transmission power [24] . Given the broadcast nature of wireless communication, an outsider attacker can jam the network by using a powerful transmitter. This attack could easily lead to prevent the reception of sensed data in case of a smart parking application. In this case, the RSU is not able to guide vehicles in the neighborhood asking for parking spots. In SDVN scenario, the attack could be mitigated in the case of a smart parking application. The RSU gathers information about the quality of channels used in the smart parking area and the report is then forwarded to the RSUC. This later builds a list of bad channels and asks the RSU to forward this list to all sensors deployed in the parking area [41] .
I. Impersonation.
An attacker can masquerade as an emergency vehicle to mislead other vehicles to slow down [24] . An adversary can also impersonate roadside units, spoofing service advertisements or safety messages. The attacker can also spread incorrect information on road conditions, influencing the route of nearby vehicles. Moreover, an attacker can send fictitious messages about road conditions for its personal benefit. Different approaches have been proposed in order to detect impersonation attacks [70] , [71] , [72] , [73] . In [70] , the authors propose a distributed and localized approach, where every vehicle can perform the detection of misbehaving nodes nearby by verifying their claimed positions. The authors rely on statistic algorithms to enhance the accuracy of position verification, and detecting the malicious nodes by observing the signal strength distribution of a suspect node over a period of time. In [73] , the authors propose to trace back the sources of anomaly in the network. They propose a method to passively identify switches composing the network path of an anomaly in the software defined network. In SDVNs, the impersonation attacks could be easily detected at the time of topology discovery, which is performed by the SDN controllers by using the Link Layer Discovery Protocols (LLDP).
J. Application-based attacks.
In the following, we consider two specific vehicular applications such as smart grid and platoon management. We present how SDVN can be efficient to detect some of the attacks on these applications.
• In a smart grid application, SDVN architecture can be used where data plane includes Electric Vehicles (EVs) and Electrical Vehicle Supply Equipments (EVSEs). Attacks on smart grid includes the network flooding, the topology poisoning, and transmission jamming. When an EV connects to an EVSE, a message is sent back to the controller, which can keep track of the current topology and status of the network for instance to indicate the level of charge of EVs. The controller can install forwarding rules, as well as able to detect potential attacks implied by anomalous behaviors of data plane elements. Anomaly detection systems such as the ones in [61] can be added to the controller in order to monitor network traffic and detect compromised data.
• In platooning vehicular applications, attacks such as changing lane, merging, accelerating or decelerating, redirecting traffic or changing direction can be performed. In SDVN architectures, the controller can instruct the elements in the data plane with appropriate rules for acceleration/deceleration, merging/splitting and changing lane according to traffic conditions and events in the roads. Then the RSU controller can collect information on platoon status and abnormal vehicle behavior by using exchanged messages. In particular, mechanisms such as the ones deployed in [64] can be efficient to detect a misbehavior in platooning SDVN applications. The RSU controller can instruct the leader of platoon on how to set specific parameters such as the acceleration, the scheduling policy of data messages in order to ensure better network utilization. The presence of an RSU controller plays a major role in keeping the platoon secure and robust against cyber-attacks. RSU controller can detect jamming and replay attacks as well as attacks targeting the management protocol. Attacks can induce splitting, merging, leaving and lane changing maneuvers.
K. Malware Attack Injection.
An attacker injects a malicious piece of software that replicates itself via the SDVN architectures through the controllers and switches. Several remote attacks launched through cellular interfaces or Bluetooth allows the attacker to take full control of the vehicle. There is a lack of message authentication for the vehicle's internal bus system, called controller area network (CAN). In [74] , the authors propose a framework for vehicular systems, based on message authentication issue of the CAN bus, and employs a trust group structure.
L. Routing based Attacks.
A sinkhole attack can be executed by an RSU controller that instructs a portion of vehicles to route all traffic to it, acting like a malicious gateway. In [75] , the authors propose a centralized approach to detect suspicious regions in the network using geo-statistical hazard model. Moreover, the authors propose a distributed monitoring approach to explore neighbors in order to detect malicious nodes. A sybil attack consists on creating multiple fictitious identities of vehicles to create an illusion of traffic congestion. Approaches such as [76] , [77] , [78] explores the feasibility of detecting sybil attacks by analyzing signal strength distribution. The algorithm in [76] is based on a statistical method to verify where a vehicle comes from, and it is able to improve the detection accuracy using statistical analysis over an observation period. In [78] , the attack is detected in a distributed manner through a passive overhearing by a set of fixed nodes. In a replay attack, the attacker sniffs a message that it reuses as is, for authenticated access to a restricted network realm. Approaches such as [64] for message authentication and authorization might be used in this context.
V. DISCUSSION AND OPEN ISSUES
In this section, first we summarize our findings along with the lessons learned that are gathered from our review on the state-of-the-art efforts of SDVN and its integration with other technologies (e.g., fog computing, vehicular cloud, NDN, and 5G) for supporting emerging vehicular network applications and services. Then we present the possible future challenges and research directions. Some of the challenges are already discussed in previous Section III-B, however, remaining challenges and open research issues are dealt in brief in this section.
As confirmed by the large number of research works that we have surveyed in this paper, the industry and academia are pushing towards the definition of new SDVN architectures. The rapid push in this direction is the result of the emerging and innovative applications (e.g., 5G, Automated Transport Systems, and Internet of Vehicles) of VANETs that have stringent requirements concerning robustness, flexibility, latency (i.e., time constraints for critical real-time decision making), security, and privacy. In the literature, the researchers envisions the efficient deployment of these applications by using the SDVNs coupled with other next generation technologies such as mobile edge computing (or fog computing), Name Data Networking (NDN), and Network Function Virtualization (NFV).
Although various architectures have been proposed in the literature to improve the communication reliability and security in VANETs, but the comprehensive investigation to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of these architectures remains an open issue. In particular, the new security and privacy vulnerabilities that arises due to the coupling of new technologies (such as SDN, NFV, and mobile edge computing) with the existing VANET should be carefully studied. For instance, researchers should not only report the benefits of using SDN to improve VANET architecture, but the new issues (e.g., service latency, mobility, and securing the SDN controller) that are inherent to SDN and now hinders the performance of the SDVNs should also be investigated and discussed. Moreover, it is important to look at how dynamic real-time change, rapid on-demand growth (scalability), and integration of service context will play a key role in enabling successful deployment and avoiding performance visibility gaps in SDVNs. In the recent future, the VANET architecture will constantly be evolving to satisfy the rapidly growing requirements of its new applications. Therefore, we now present few research directions that could be exploited in this direction.
• Security of 5G slicing for V2X Services: SDN and automotive systems are key enablers for 5G systems. The SDVN umbrella term actually covers a multiplicity of use cases, characterized by single or multi-tenancy and by diverging service requirements. Services span from a single automated vehicle in a smart city, to enhanced realtime navigation systems on board. In today's networks, multiple services are supported over the same architecture, conceived with no elasticity by design. These services are processed by the same network elements in the core network and by sharing the same resources in the radio network. The concept of network slices has emerged as a novel technology that isolates network functions and resources. A network slice is a collection of 5G network functions and specific RAT parameters that are combined together in order to provide a specific use case or a business model [79] , [80] . These resources and functions are tailored to a vertical market's need on a shared infrastructure. The network slicing is based on virtualization, where the network function virtualization (NFV) paradigm is based on the fact that network functions are not tied to the hardware. Hence, these network functions can be deployed as virtual network functions, and they run on different platforms. The SDN controller has the role to configure VNF and physical network function chains in a given slice. Due to the features of V2V or V2I, different network slices can be presented such as: 1) slice for autonomous driving and other safety-critical services (e.g., platooning), 2) slice supporting tele-operated driving; 3) slice for vehicular infotainment applications; and 4) slice for vehicle remote diagnostics. Security and privacy challenges could be raised in one slice (intraslice) or inter-slice communication. One should ensure that one slice cannot consume other slice's resources. Also, sharing a physical platform might also lead to attacks such as the side-channel attacks and privacy leaks. Moreover, an adversary might obtain capabilities to launch attacks to slices and on-going slices for instance in order to modify the configuration of other customer's slice instance, compromising a network function, or even terminate a slice. Hence, this will expose the services and network to disclosure and removal. We identify here the need to investigate security requirements and security solutions for network V2X slicing. Moreover, we should mention that important efforts are still needed from researchers and industries to design a complete approach to enable secure slicing in 5G vertical domains such as the automotive systems.
traffic. This placement of secure functions throughout the flow traffic of tenants should be dynamic in order to cope with the mobility of vehicles and the different services that they provide. In [83] , the authors present the security threats regarding the deployment and implementation of virtual network functions.
• Mobile Edge Computing Security: The Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) [84] is based on a virtualized platform, and enables applications to run at the edge of the network. The environment of MEC is characterized by low latency, proximity, high bandwidth, and location awareness. MEC opens up services to consumers and to industries to deliver their mission-critical applications. The automotive system can benefit from the MEC in order to extend the connected car cloud into a distributed mobile base station environment. The MEC architecture enables data and applications to be placed close to the vehicles. In the safety vehicular applications, the MEC applications can receive local messages directly from the applications in the vehicles and the roadside sensors, analyze them and then propagate hazard warnings and other latencysensitive messages to other vehicles in the area. This enables a nearby vehicle to receive data in few milliseconds, allowing the driver/vehicle to immediately react. The MEC could host different VNFs in order to allow secure and trusted communications of services between vehicles or vehicles to infrastructures. However, the MEC comes up with security challenges related to the secure service chaining of different VNFs hosted in the MEC, the certification of VNFs at the MEC, distributed machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection at MEC in order to reduce the bottleneck and energy consumption of vehicles/sensors.
• Information Centric Networking (ICN) based Solutions: Originally envisioned to address the pressing needs (e.g., device mobility, network scalability, access to information, and distributed content production) of today's Internet, the ICN has turned out to be a promising paradigm for different network scenarios, including SDN [85] and VANETs [86] [87] . As evidence, several preliminary investigations have been performed on a widely known ICN instance, namely Named-Data Networking (NDN). It is a new network communication model in which the traditional host-centric paradigm has been moved to the new information-centric one. Due to the various benefits that ICN provides, researchers have investigated its usage for addressing different VANET challenges [88] [89] [90] . For instance, authors in [86] propose a V2I communication architecture that exploits deployed RSU infrastructure for content retrieval in NDN-VANETs. The authors show that the use of NDN could provide improvements in VANET concerning mobility management, resource consumption, and faster content retrieval. We believe that the use of NDN in SDVNs or SDN in NDN-VANETs has significant potential to improve the VANETs, however, these domains still remains highly under investigated and needs significant work to move forward for real-world deployments. In particular, the new issues and challenges that arises from the combination of these three technologies needs to be fully understood and adequate solutions for the identified problems should be envisioned [91] .
• Mobility Management: Providing efficient mobility management in SDVNs is important to keep a consistent and accurate global topology view at SDN controller, which is needed to correctly enable various networking functionalities (e.g., routing, traffic management, security services, and network virtualization) in the network. Although SDN provides flexible network control, its applicability to mobile networks (such as VANETs and 5G) is still in its infancy. Therefore, new mobility management techniques such as proactive mobility management algorithm implementation and controller delegates partial control of mobility management to the forwarding entities are needed [92] . One way to minimize the mobility induced communication challenges is to develop efficient and accurate mobility prediction models [32] . In SDVNs, first with the help of the available global topology information at control plane, the SDN controller can perform accurate mobility prediction through advanced machine learning algorithms (e.g., artificial neural network (ANN)). Then based on the mobility prediction results, the successful transmission probability and average delay of each vehicle's request under frequent network topology changes can be estimated by RSUs or BS. Another option is to use Information Centric Networking (ICN) paradigm for efficient data retrieval in high mobility scenarios. ICN facilitates data retrieval independent from the specific recipients bound to fixed physical locations which could be a key enabler for future vehicular networks because it fixes the old unsolved issues of mobility management in traditional IP-based systems [93] . However, the ICN architecture also presents a new set of security vulnerabilities such as Interest flooding attacks, cache poisoning attacks, and privacy violation attacks, these threats need to be properly investigated before its use in SDVNs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we thoroughly investigate the state-of-theart SDN enabled vehicular network architectures for their positive and negative impacts mainly in terms of security and privacy. Based on the existing SDVN architecture, we analyze different security vulnerabilities and attacks. We propose an array of open security research issues that require attention of industries and researchers to establish a way forward for more secure and efficient SDVNs. Moreover, we discuss the applicability of the existing solutions and propose the possible countermeasures to handle these attacks. At this point, we can safely conclude that the research on SDVNs is just begin and SDN can support VANET to achieve its objectives that are needed to use it for next generation intelligent VANET applications and services. However, there are many issues that needs to be addressed before its practical deployment. This paper opens the debate for secure slicing in V2X communications. With the set of future research directions and open questions that we have raised, we hope that our work will
